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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF
UTAH, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
L E 0 NARD A. M 'AD S E N and

ARDETH MADSEN, his wife, also
known as Ardith :Madsen,
Defendants and Respondernts,

Case No.

7584

vs.

BOB JEPPSEN,
Purchaser omd Co-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

INTRODUCTION
This is an ·appeal by plaintiff from an adverse decision and order of the District Court of the Seventh
Judicial District in and for Sanpete County, State ;of
Utah, Hon. L. Leland Larson, Judge.
1
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STATEMENT OF CASE
In this action a judgment was rendered for plaintiff
against the defendants named in

th~

sum of $4,121.19,

and a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage which was
securi·ty for the amount of $1950.00 of said judgment
given by defendants and covering ''Lots 1 and 2 of Block
28, Plat "A" of Manti City Survey," in Sanpete County,
Utah (Rec. page 21). An Order of S'ale and Certified
copy of Decree was handed to the Sheriff of Sanpete
County. The Sheriff noticed the sale, purportedly made
a sale, and filed his return (Rec. I>P· 27 to 33), showing
the property as having been sold in one parcel and for
only the sum of $501.00 to the named purchaser.
The plaintiff filed an application for vacation of the
sale upon the grounds ( 1) that the sale was not made
of the property in ·two parcels; (2) that the proceedings
of the sheriff were irregular and he abused his discretion; and (3) that the sale price accepted by the sheriff
was grossly incommensurate to the fair market value
of the property sold; and submit·ted therewith its bid
of $1950.00 for the property (Rec. ptp. 24 to 26).
After hearing on the application the Court rendered
its decisron dated August 7, 1950, denying the application ( Rec. p. 46). From ·this decision and order the
plaintiff appeals.
2
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;

THE EVIDENCE
The Sheriff, Ulysses Larsen, testified that he was
handed typewritten notices by the attorney for the Bank
and was instructed to fix the time of sale at 11 o'clock
A.M., which would give plenty of time for the interested
parties to be over to ·bid on the property; the plain tiff '-s
place of business being at Nephi, 43 miles dis taut. And
that it was the understanding that he, the sheriff, make
the time for sale at 11 A.M., but that he forgot. He further testified that he never notified the attorney for, or
any officer of, the Bank ·that the sale was set for 10 A.M.
instead of 11 A.M. that before 11 A.M., one, Han·son, retpL.
resenting the Bank appeared and said that he thought
the sale was at 11 A.M. That at the time of sale the sheriff
stated to the bidders that the property was worth wbout
$1000.00 ( Tr. pp. 3-6).

'

Witness C. H. Beal, a disinterested real estate
broker, testified that there was a fence dividing lots 1
and 2, and he saw it the morning he testified; that the
improvements were on lot 1, and lot 2 was vacant; and
that the property was worth from $1400 to $1500, market
value (Tr. pp. 8-10).
POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL
ON APPEAL
The appellant relies upon the following points for a
reversal of the decision and order appealed from:
3
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POINT I.
THAT THE SALE WAS NOT MADE OF THE PROPERTY
IN TWO PARCELS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 69(e) 3, RESULTING IN GROSSLY
INADEQUATE BIDS, TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF.

POINT II.
THAT THE PROCEEDING BY THE SHERIFF IN FAILING TO NOTICE SALE AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK A.M., AS
INSTRUCTED BY PLAINTIFF AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY
PLAINTIFF AND SHERIFF, AND HI'S FAILING TO NOTIFY
PLAINTIFF OF HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
INSTRUCTION AND CONFORM ~WITH SUCH UNDERSTANDING AND THEREBY PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF
FROM BEING PRESENT, RESULTED IN GROSSLY INADEQUATE BIDS AND SALE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY,
AND CONSTITUTED A PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITY.

POINT III.
THAT THE SALE PRICE ACCEPTED BY THE SHERIFF
WAS GROSSLY INCOMMENSURATE TO THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SOLD.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE SALE WAS NOT MADE OF THE PROPERTY
IN TWO PARCELS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 69(e) 3, RESULTING IN GROSSLY
INADEQUATE BIDS; TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69 (e) 3 provides
th81t when the sale is of real estate, consisting of several
lmown lots or parcels, they must be sold se'Parately.
The description lots 1 and 2 is indicative of there being
two known parcels. In this case there was a fence divid4
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:I

ing the lots; the improvements were on one lot and the
other lot, lot 2, was vacant. To say that only one parcel
was comprised by lots 1 and 2 would be tantrunount to
saying tha:t a sale could not have been made of the area
in two parcels, that it would have been necessary to have
divided one parcel to have sold lot 1 to A and lot 2 to B.
Section 104-55-1 U.C.A. 1943, was retained under
the rules, and it is therein provided that in foreclosure
the order of sale should direct the sheriff to proceed
and sell the same according to the provisions of law
relating to sales on ex~ution, and the rule above referred to applies in this case.
42 C.J. 200, holds:
'' ConS'titutional or statutory directions. The
sale must also conform to directions contained
in a constitutional or statutory provision applicable to the foreclosure, as, for example, that where
the sale is of real property and consis-ting of sev- ·
eral known lots or parcels, they must be sold
separately * * *.''
Our contention is supported by Oole vs. Oanto~.n
Mng. Co., 59 Utah 140, 202 P.ac. 830, which was a mortgage foreclosure.
The plaintiff cannot be held to have waived the
requirement of the statute or rule by not being present
at the time of sale in that the reason it was not represented was due to excusable indavertence due to the
mistake of the Sheriff. And, as will appear hereinafter,
5
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the interests of the plaintiff creditor are taken into
account as well as the debtors. As to the purchaser the
rule of caveat emptor applied.
"The rule of caveat emptor applies to purchases at judicial sales, and the ·purchaser of said
property took it subject to all the infirmities of
the proceedings of sale." Kimball· et al. vs. Salisbury, et al.,.19 Utah 161 at page 177, 56 Pac. 973.

POINT II.
THAT THE PROCEEDING BY THE SHERIFF IN FAILING TO NOTICE SALE AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK A.M., AS
INSTRUCTED BY PLAINTIFF AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY
PLAINTIFF AND SHERIFF, AND HIS FAILING TO NOTIFY
PLAINTIFF OF HIS F AlLURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
INSTRUCTION AND CONFORM WITH SUCH UNDERSTANDING AND THEREBY PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF
FROM BEING PRESENT, RESULTED IN GROSSLY INADEQUATE BIDS AND SALE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY,
AND CONSTITUTED A PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITY.

The Sheriff's own testimony indicates that he understood plaintiff intended being present to bid at the sale.
He stated that was given as a reason to fix the time at
11 A.M., to give plenty of time to interested ,parties to
be over there to bid on that property. He knew that
he should have fixed the time of sale at 11 A.M. instead
of 10 A.M., but he forgot. Then having failed to conform
to the instructi·on and understanding he failed to notify
the plaintiff of such failure. And, having failed in those
two respects, and on receiving no bid higher than half
of ·what he considered the property to ·be worth, and
G
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kno\'.'ing plaintiff intended cOining over to bid on the
property, he failed to exercise any discretion by postponing the sale until 11 A.M., which he could have done
by a siln'Ple proclamation to that effect.
Under U.R.C.P. 69( e) 2 it is provided:
'·If at the tinw appointed for the sale of any
real or personal property on-execution the officer
shall deem it expedient and for the interests of all
persons concerned to pos,tpone the sale for want
of purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may
postpone the san1e frOin time to time * * *. ''

·.,

The conduct of the sheriff was so irregular under
the circumstances of this case that prejudice to the plaintiff cannot be doubted. It cannot be said that such conduct on the part of a sheriff could be expe0ted and should
have been anticipated by plaintiff. No, the sheriff has
a higher responsibility and duty to the Courts, litigants
and public than to permit of such theory or rule.

POINT III.
THAT THE SALE PRICE ACCEPTED BY THE SHERIFF
WAS GROSSLY INCOMMENSURATE TO THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SOLD.

·'

The sheriff knew that the price sold for was grossly
incommensurate to the fair market value, because he
announced to the bid(lers that he considered the property
worth about one thousand dollars. The broker witness
said it was worth fourteen to fifteen hundred dollars.
Plaintiff submitted a bid with its application of $1950.00.

7
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In point on the subject we submit the following
authoritative statements:
In State vs. Harrower (Okla.), 29 Pac. 2nd 123, the
case of D'U!ncan vs. Eck, et al. (Okla.), 16'6 Pac. 121,
wherein the rules applicable to ~this matter are condensed
and crystallized, is cited and in part set out, and I quote
therefrom:
''As a general rule mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient ground for setting aside
a sheriff's sale, but all of the authorities hold
uniformly that when gross inadequacy of consideration, coupled with very slight additional circumstances, is sufficient to set aside such sale,
and that where the consideration is so grossly inadequa;te as to shock the conscience of the court,
or is very great, it is alone sufficient." '(Citing
authorities.)
"It is the duty of the court in confirming or
setting aside a sheriff's sale to protect all parties
concerned, the owners and creditors of the owners
as well as the purchaser.
''Whether the sale should be confirmed is a
matter within the sound discretion of the court;
but it is a discretion that must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily, and if abused is subject
to review on appeal. The sale must appear ,to be
in all essential respects fair and proper, or it will
not be confirmed, and the simple fact that confirmation would sacrifice the interests of those
entitled to the protection of the court is sufficient
ground for a refusal to confirm. The court will
8
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not, however, be astute to find objections, and if
there is no eYidence of unfairness, deception, or
impropriety the sale is properly confirmed.''
In State vs. Ha.rrower, supra, the case of F<owler vs.
Krutz, 38 Pac. 808, is cHed and the syllabus therefrom
quoted as follo·ws :
''Inadequacy of price, taken alone, is seldom,
if ever, sufficient to authorize the setting aside of
a sheriff's sale; yet great inadequacy of price is
a circumstance which courts will always regard
with suspicion, and iri such case slight additional
circums·tances only are required to authorize the
setting aside of the sale. * * * .And in the present
case it is held that the circumstances under which
the sale was made, and the irregularities therein,
in connection wi-th the gross inadequacy of price,
are sufficient to sustain the ruling of the court in
setting aside the sale.''
One further quotation which is applicable to the
maHer before the Court taken from Suring State Barnk
vs. Giese, et al. (Wis.), 246 N.W. 556, 85 .A.L.R. 1477, at
page 1479:
''The court may decline to confirm the sale
where the bid is substantially inadequate. While
it has ·been said that mere inadequacy of consideration is not a ground for setting aside a foreclosure sale, this rule has been rather carefully
circumscribed by the court. In Griswold vs. Barden ('\Vis.), 130 N.W. 952, 953, this court speaking
through ~[r. Chief Justice Winslow, said: 'It has
been said by this court that iot is settled practice
9
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of courts of equity to refuse a resale for mere
inadequacy of consideration, and that this court
will not depart from that rule where no uther
cause exists.' :Meehan vs. Blodgett, Wis. 57 N.W.
291. This is doubtless a corre.ct statement of the
rule, but it seems from the argument in the present case that it may be easily misunderstood. It
must be strictly confined to cases where there is
abbolutely no fact appearing, except that the price
is inadequate. Whenever other facts appear, such
as mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence on
the part of the interested parties or of intending
bidders, as a result of which it seems ·to the court
the failure to obtain a fair and adequate price for
the property was due in whole or in part to such
mistake, misapprehension, or inadvertence, the
court will readily refuse to approve the sale. No
fraud is necessary ·to justify the court in so withholding its a:pproval. The question simply is, Is
the sale under all the circumstances one of which
the court in justice to all parties should approve~''
The right of the creditor to realize as much from
the value uf the property is of as great a dignity as the
right of the debtor to obtain a fair value and credit for
the proper,ty sold. If it were the debtor applying under
similar circumstances and factual matters the Court
would not hesitate to set aside the sale.
The writers do not intend ~to impute malfeasance on
the part of the sheriff in this instance. But will it be
wise on the part of this Court to affirm the dereliction
on the part of this sheriff and set a precedent 1

10
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In this case we have as argument and grounds for
reversal not just one proposition, but three: (1) Failure
to sell the two parcels of real estate in two separate
parcels; ( :2) Prejudicial irregularities on the part of th~
sheriff; and ( 3) Gross inadequacy of the sale price.
So, the ques.tion simply is, ''Is the sale under all
the circumstances one of which the court in justice to all
parties should approve 1'' Suri.ng State Bank vs. Giese,
et al., supra.

'Ve submit that

the decision and order appealed
from should be reversed and the court make an order
setting aside and vacating the purported sale S'O made
and directing that the bid of plaintiff be ac,Cepted and
approved.
Respectfully su•bmitted,

P. N. ANDERSON,
EKSAYN ANDERSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
67 South Main,
Nephi, Utah.
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